财政部拆除伊朗政权的全球秘密货币网络美国财政部
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财政部拆除伊朗政权的全球秘密货币网络
2026 年 8 月 7 日
华盛顿——今天，美国财政部外国资产控制办公室 (OFAC) 对跨越多个国家的多个网络采取了行动，这些网络使伊朗的拉赫巴尔银行系统能够转移数亿美元。伊朗急需外汇，而令该政权雪上加霜的是，它因影子银行体系内的腐败和管理不善而损失了大量资金。
美国财政部长斯科特·贝森特 (Scott Bessent) 表示：“伊朗的影子银行体系在经济愤怒的影响下崩溃了，该政权已经没有办法转移资金了。” “每一个维持该政权运转的推动者都在为自己设定目标。财政部将继续揭露这些网络，并切断它们与美国金融体系的联系。”
随着财政部不断揭露该政权最值得信赖的协调者的不可靠，伊朗失去了对该政权管理不善的经济、流氓武装部队和破坏稳定的恐怖主义代理人的生存至关重要的关键收入来源，进一步损害了该政权在本国人民中的信誉。
今天的行动是根据第 13902 号行政命令 (E.O.) 采取的，该命令针对的是在伊朗金融和石油部门运营的人员，并推进了总统国家安全总统备忘录 2 (NSPM-2)，以对伊朗施加最大压力。这是 OFAC 2026 年针对伊朗影子银行机构的第八次行动，包括针对伊朗银行及其 rahbar 幌子公司、交易所及其经理、主要金融家以及依赖这些金融网络洗钱和汇回收入的伊朗进出口商。财政部仍然致力于维持对伊朗的最大压力，并针对该政权产生、转移和汇回资金的能力。
沙赫尔银行交换所
伊朗沙赫尔银行在其 rahbar 公司、总部位于伊朗的 Farab Soroush Afagh Qeshm (FSAQ) 和总部位于迪拜的 HMS Trading FZE 的帮助下，在帮助伊朗政权从海外石油销售中收回收入方面发挥着关键作用，帮助伊朗一些最著名的石油出口商，包括伊朗国家石油公司、Naftiran Intertrade Co (NICO)、Triliance Petrochemical Co. Ltd. 和武装部队总参谋部Sepher Energy Jahan 公司。
Shahr Bank 及其 rahbars 尤其依赖迪拜的两家交易所：Titan Exchange（该公司也以 Titan Land Petrochemicals Trading L.L.C 和 Titan Energy Petroleum Products Trading Co. L.L.C 名义运营）和 Alps International L.L.C-FZ (Alps International)。
Titan Exchange 多年来一直应 Shahr Bank 及其受制裁的 rahbar 公司 FSAQ 的要求启用交易，截至 2026 年初，Titan Exchange 代表 Shahr Bank 持有数千万美元。 Titan Exchange 还与伊朗重要金融家侯赛因·戈尔巴尼·扎赫德 (Hossein Ghorbani Zahed) 关系密切，后者最近因支持穆罕默德·侯赛因·沙姆哈尼 (Shamkhani) 非法运输和逃避制裁网络而受到制裁。
FSAQ 运营一个非法支付网络，以促进与中国和阿联酋空壳公司的交易，并与 Alps International 密切合作，后者代表 FSAQ 执行付款。位于阿联酋的 FSAQ 专家运营团队（被称为“安全小组”）与 Alps International 一起，为通过中间账户接收资金的中国空壳公司进行资金转账并处理文件。阿尔卑斯国际公司以选定接收资金的空壳公司的抬头开具发票，然后使用空壳公司的银行账户协调付款。 2026 年，阿尔卑斯国际以多种货币实现了数亿美元的交易。
FSAQ 和 HMS Trading FZE 之前已根据 E.O. 指定。 13902 从事伊朗经济金融部门的经营，并分别由 Shahr 银行拥有或控制，或者直接或间接为 Shahr 银行行事或声称为 Shahr 银行行事或代表 Shahr 银行行事。
Titan Exchange 已根据 E.O. 被指定13902 为 Shahr 银行提供物质协助、赞助或提供财务、物质或技术支持，或商品或服务或支持 Shahr 银行。 Alps International 根据 E.O. 被指定13902 从事伊朗经济金融部门的运营。
这一行动的幕后是 Shahr Bank 和 FSAQ 员工、协调员和支持人员组成的专业网络。伊朗国民 Saeed Ghasempour 是 Shahr 银行员工，他与 FSAQ 和 Alps International 密切合作，并与受制裁的俄罗斯 VTB 银行就货币兑换进行协调。伊朗国民 Shima Sharifi 和 Peivand Mohammad 是 FSAQ 员工，负责协调发票和付款，以支持 FSAQ 逃避制裁活动。伊朗国民 Amir Hendi 是一位信息技术专家，为 Titan Exchange 提供关键基础设施支持。
在世界各地（尤其是香港）注册的众多空壳公司扩大了这个由伊朗经营、总部位于迪拜的网络的影响范围。总部位于香港的 Oviedo Overseas Company Limited 已被 FSAQ 和 Alps International 使用，于 2026 年中期完成了价值数百万美元的交易订单。同样，总部位于新加坡的 Cailafang Pte.自 2025 年底以来，FSAQ 和阿尔卑斯国际公司已在多笔交易中使用该公司，以实现价值数千万美元的伊朗贸易。
许多空壳公司和幌子公司与伊朗影子银行机构中的其他参与者合作并为其提供支持。总部位于香港的幌子公司 Blue Dash General Trading Company Limited 和 Gleaming HK Trading Limited 自成立以来一直是影子银行活动的经常性对手方，为 Pedram Pirouzan 和 Amin Exchanges 等伊朗交易所代表逃避制裁者（包括 Shamkhani 航运网络）进行交易提供便利。总部位于迪拜的伊朗幌子公司 Aydeniz General Trading L.L.C 也同样被用来促进与伊朗交易所的交易，其中包括与伊朗军方有联系的重要影子银行实体萨达夫交易所 (Sadaf Exchange)。
Saeed Ghasempour 是根据 E.O. 被指定的。 13902 直接或间接为 Shahr Bank 行事或声称为 Shahr Bank 行事或代表 Shahr Bank 行事。 Peivand Mohammad 是根据 E.O. 被指定的。 13902 直接或间接为 FSAQ 行事或声称为 FSAQ 行事。 Amir Hendi 根据 E.O. 被指定13902 直接或间接为 FSAQ 行事或声称为 FSAQ 行事。 Shima Sharifi、Oviedo Overseas Company Limited、Cailafang Pte. Ltd.、Blue Dash General Trading Company Limited、Gleaming HK Trading Limited 和 Aydeniz General Trading L.L.C 根据 E.O. 被指定。 13902 从事伊朗经济金融部门的运营。
为了推进财政部确保伊朗恶意行为者及其推动者与美国金融体系隔绝的使命，OFAC 还根据 E.O. 指定 Basheer Abdulkadhim Alwan al-Shabbani (Al-Shabbani) 13224，经修订，为伊斯兰革命卫队圣城部队（IRGC-QF）提供物质援助、赞助或提供财政、物质或技术支持，或商品或服务或支持其。沙巴尼负责支持伊斯兰革命卫队圣城军的行动，为从伊朗运输战士、武器和资金到伊斯兰革命卫队圣城军成员以及在邻国活动的与伊朗结盟的民兵组织提供便利。
制裁的影响
由于今天的行动，被指定或被阻止的人员的所有财产和财产权益都被描述为
[正文过长，已截取前部进行翻译]
Treasury Dismantles Iranian Regime’s Global Clandestine Currency Networks | U.S. Department of the Treasury
Press Releases
Treasury Dismantles Iranian Regime’s Global Clandestine Currency Networks
August 7, 2026
WASHINGTON —Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against multiple networks spanning several countries for enabling Iran’s rahbar banking system to move hundreds of millions of dollars. Iran is desperate for foreign currency, and to make matters worse for the regime, it is losing substantial sums to corruption and mismanagement within the shadow banking system.
“Iran’s shadow banking system is buckling under Economic Fury, and the regime is running out of ways to move money,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent . “Every facilitator that keeps the regime afloat is putting a target on its own back. Treasury will continue to expose these networks and cut them off from the U.S. financial system.”
As Treasury continues to expose the unreliability of the regime’s most trusted facilitators, Iran loses access to key revenue streams critical to the survival of this regime’s mismanaged economy, rogue armed forces, and destabilizing terrorist proxies—further undermining the regime’s credibility with its own people.
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which targets persons operating in Iran’s financial and petroleum sectors, and advances the President’s National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), to impose maximum pressure on Iran. This is OFAC’s eighth action in 2026 targeting Iran’s shadow banking apparatus, including targeting Iranian banks and their rahbar front companies , exchange houses and their managers , major financiers , and the Iranian importers and exporters who rely on these financial networks to launder and repatriate revenues. Treasury remains committed to maintaining maximum pressure on Iran and to targeting the regime’s ability to generate, move, and repatriate funds.
Shahr bank Exchange Houses
Iran’s Shahr Bank—with the help of its rahbar companies, Iran-based Farab Soroush Afagh Qeshm (FSAQ) and Dubai-based HMS Trading FZE —plays a critical role in helping the Iranian regime retrieve revenue from its oil sales overseas, aiding some of Iran’s most prominent exporters of petroleum, including the National Iranian Oil Company , Naftiran Intertrade Co (NICO), Triliance Petrochemical Co. Ltd. , and Armed Forces General Staff cover company Sepher Energy Jahan .
Shahr Bank and its rahbars rely on two Dubai-based exchange house fronts in particular: Titan Exchange —which also operates under the business names Titan Land Petrochemicals Trading L.L.C and Titan Energy Petroleum Products Trading Co. L.L.C—and Alps International L.L.C-FZ (Alps International).
Titan Exchange has for years enabled transactions at the request of Shahr Bank and its sanctioned rahbar company FSAQ, and as of early 2026, Titan Exchange held tens of millions of dollars on behalf of Shahr Bank. Titan Exchange is also closely affiliated with Hossein Ghorbani Zahed , a key Iranian financier recently sanctioned for his role in supporting the Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani (Shamkhani) illicit shipping and sanctions evasion network.
FSAQ operates an illicit payment network to facilitate transactions with China- and UAE-based shell companies and collaborates closely with Alps International, which in turn executes the payments on behalf of FSAQ. A UAE-based operational team of FSAQ specialists—identified as the “Safe Group”—alongside Alps International, carries out funds transfers and handles documentation for Chinese shell companies receiving money through intermediary accounts. Alps International generates invoices on the letterhead of a shell company chosen to receive the money and then coordinates payments using the shell’s bank accounts. In 2026, Alps International enabled hundreds of millions of dollars of transactions in multiple currencies.
FSAQ and HMS Trading FZE were previously designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy and for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Shahr Bank, respectively.
Titan Exchange is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Shahr Bank. Alps International is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy.
Behind the scenes of this operation is a professional network of Shahr Bank and FSAQ employees, facilitators, and support staff. Iranian national Saeed Ghasempour is a Shahr Bank employee who works closely with FSAQ and Alps International and has coordinated with sanctioned Russian VTB Bank on currency conversions. Iranian nationals Shima Sharifi and Peivand Mohammad are FSAQ employees who coordinate invoices and payments to enable FSAQ’s sanctions evasion activities. Iranian national Amir Hendi is an information technology specialist providing critical infrastructure support to Titan Exchange.
Extending the reach of this Iranian-run, Dubai-based network are numerous shell companies registered around the world, particularly in Hong Kong. Hong Kong-based Oviedo Overseas Company Limited has been used by FSAQ and Alps International to complete transaction orders in mid-2026 worth millions of dollars. Similarly, Singapore-based Cailafang Pte. Ltd. has been used by FSAQ and Alps International in multiple transactions since late 2025 to enable tens of millions of dollars’ worth of Iranian trade.
Many of these shell and front companies work with and enable other actors throughout Iran’s shadow banking apparatus. Hong Kong-based front companies Blue Dash General Trading Company Limited and Gleaming HK Trading Limited have been recurring counterparties to shadow banking activities since their establishment, facilitating transactions by Iranian exchange houses like Pedram Pirouzan and Amin Exchanges on behalf of sanctions evaders, including the Shamkhani shipping network. Aydeniz General Trading L.L.C , a Dubai-based Iranian front company, has likewise been used to facilitate transactions with Iranian exchange houses, including Sadaf Exchange , a key shadow banking entity tied to Iran’s military.
Saeed Ghasempour is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Shahr Bank. Peivand Mohammad is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, FSAQ. Amir Hendi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, FSAQ. Shima Sharifi, Oviedo Overseas Company Limited, Cailafang Pte. Ltd., Blue Dash General Trading Company Limited, Gleaming HK Trading Limited, and Aydeniz General Trading L.L.C are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy.
In furtherance of Treasury’s mission to ensure Iranian malign actors and their enablers are cut off from the U.S. financial system, OFAC is also designating Basheer Abdulkadhim Alwan al-Shabbani (Al-Shabbani) pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—Qods Force (IRGC-QF). Al-Shabbani was responsible for supporting the operations of the IRGC-QF by facilitating the transport of fighters, weapons, and money from Iran to members of the IRGC-QF and Iran-aligned militia groups operating in neighboring countries.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to FinCEN’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List .
Click here for more information on the persons designated today.
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